Recent Developments In Kansas Appellate Cases
AUGUST, 2025
ACQUIESCENCE—Right to Judicial Review. In the Matter of the Marriage of Boorigie, Docket No. 127,951 (Unpub. Court of Appeals February 21, 2025. Sedgwick Dist. Ct., J. Kirby, appeal dismissed). Husband appealed the asset division after a 30-year marriage. He acquiesced in the judgment, which cuts off appellate review, “when he voluntarily complied with the judgment by assuming the burdens or accepting the benefits of the judgment contested on appeal. A party who voluntarily complies with a judgment should not be allowed to pursue an inconsistent position by appealing from that judgment.” In this case, he accepted the benefit of the district court’s order by withdrawing funds from an account, in order to make an equalization payment ordered by the court. In so doing he violated the conditions of a court order (as to the withdrawal of funds). He “cannot violate the conditions of a court order to avail himself of the benefits of that order while simultaneously disavowing the burdens of the order by seeking to appeal the order.”
ADOPTION– Father’s failure without reasonable cause to provide support for the mother during the 6 months prior to the child’s birth is excused. In the Matter of the Adoption of Baby Boy S., Docket No. 128,197 (Unpub. K. Ct. of App. July 3, 2025). The Sedgwick County District Court denied termination of father’s rights (which termination would vitiate the need for his consent to the adoption) because, although he “failed to support Mother during the six months before the child’s birth, he had reasonable cause to do so ‘for a portion’ of that time. K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(1)(D). Mother told father she had miscarried. This provided a “temporary excuse” during the six-month period for the failure to support.
CHILD SUPPORT—Considerations beyond Guidelines. Laches. In the Matter of the Parentage of M.R., Docket No. 127,847 (7/25/2025, Wyandotte Dist. Ct., Judge K. Lynch affirmed). The Kansas Child Support Guidelines provide not only for current and future child support but also retroactive child support and expense reimbursement, which may go back to the date of the child’s birth. For any period more than five years before commencement of a paternity action, the party seeking child support “has the burden to show the amount requested does not exceed actual expenses made on behalf of the child. K.S.A. 23-2215(f)(3). The significance of this case is that father “gave” mother a home in 2009 and asked the court to credit his child support arrears for all or a portion of the value of that home. The court did so, and the decision was upheld on appeal. “ The Child Support Guidelines do not limit the court’s authority to calculate child support where the facts of a case fall outside the Guidelines, so appellate courts review such calculations strictly for an abuse of discretion.” Further, past-due child support payments are not barred by laches during a child’s minority that cannot be waived by inaction or passive acquiescence by the mother.
CUSTODY—Necessary Findings. In the Matter of the Marriage of S.L.W. and S.M.W., n/k/a S.M.T., Docket No. 128,075 (Unpub. Court of Appeals February 21, 2005. Decatur Dist. Ct., J. Pratt, affirmed). The district court awarded primary residential custody of a now-16 year old daughter to Mother without finding fault or deficiency in Father’s parenting. In fact, father had been the primary residential parent prior to the court’s decision. Such was not an abuse of discretion. The child told the court in chambers without the presence of her parents that she argued a lot with her father and voiced concerns about how her father treated her. The child told the court her mother respected her more than her father and her father repeatedly called her “selfish” for not babysitting her brother or doing the brother’s chores for him. She told the judge she wanted to live with her mother, which she had told both her parents many times.
MARITAL PROPERTY—Approaches to Division—Personal Injury Award of Damages. In the Matter of the Marriage of Meek and Meek, Docket No. 124,904 (Kan. S. Ct. 4.18.2025. Johnson Dist. Ct., J. Jayaram, reversed). K.S.A. 23-2601 defines separate property in a marriage. K.S.A. 23-2801(a) defines what happens to separate property when a divorce action is filed. “All property owned by married persons…shall become marital property at the time of commencement by one spouse against the other of an action in which a final decree is entered for divorce, separate maintenance, or annulment.” Plain statutory language generally trumps judicial decisions and the parties’ policy preferences. As such, “future references by courts in Kansas to either the ‘analytical approach’ or the ‘mechanical approach’ are disapproved” in determining how to divide marital property. The factors in K.S.A. 23-2802(c) are to be considered. They are not a direct match to the “analytical approach” factors. According to the Court of Appeals, “all property owned by both spouses is subject to equitable division under what is described as the ‘mechanical approach’, regardless of the source of income. The “analytical approach” allows courts to analyze the nature and underlying reasons for compensation in determining how to classify property…all this having to do with whether a personal injury damage award to wife was marital property was subject to division by the court. “Per the plain statutory text, all property of married persons becomes marital property upon commencement of divorce proceedings in which a court enters a final decree of divorce.”
PRETRIAL ORDER—Consideration of Issues Not Included. In the Matter of the Marriage of Auten and Auten, Docket No. 127,075 (7/27/2025, Wabaunsee Dist. Ct., Judge J.Elder, reversed and remanded with directions). The district court’s consideration of issues outside the pretrial order in determining an equalization payment in a divorce was reversible error. The pretrial order said “the only issue before the court is the appreciation of real property between the date of marriage and the date of filing the petition for divorce.” While the parties later filed amended pretrial questionnaires, the pretrial order was never amended. Husband argued that the “pretrial order identified the appreciation in value of the real property during the marriage as the only issue before the court, so the district court should have limited the division of the marital assets and the determination of the equalization payment to that evidence” rather than considering the value of other assets as well. He argued that the proper method for the district court to address anything other than what was in the pretrial order was for a party to move to amend the pretrial order. The appellate court acknowledged that all property is subject to division, K.S.A.23-2801(a), but “the issue in this case is whether the district court’s discretion in dividing marital property is limited by the pretrial order”, which the court of appeals said it was. The lesson of this case is to be sure the pretrial order identifies all issues to be tried, especially but not only in terms of division of property. Make sure there is not language in the order that could narrow/exclude consideration of an asset value that the parties/a party wants considered.
VACCINATIONS—Free Exercise Clause. In the Matter of the Parentage of M.S. and J. C., Docket No. 126,373 (Unpub. K. Ct. of App. 7.11.2025. J. Woltman, Johnson County District Court, affirmed). Mother objected to vaccinations for her children on religious grounds, including the Free Exercise (freedom of religion) Clause of the United States Constitution, found in its First Amendment, which is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 532 (2021); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Such protections are not absolute. State v. Harrison, 292 Kan. 674-75, 679, 256 P. 3d 826 (2011). While the district court may not weigh the merit of one parent’s religious belief or lack of belief against the other’s, 292 Kan. at 683, the order in this case “does no more than resolve a personal disagreement between Mother and Father consistent with the recommendation of an appropriate medical professional selected, at the court’s request, by Father.” The issue is medical, not judicial. The district court deferred the medical question to a doctor. Thus, this dispute is different than the one in Harrison. The district court order to have the children vaccinated does not contravene Mother’s due process rights. It deferred to the opinion of a private doctor chosen by father, which doctor recommended vaccination, which ultimately was carried out.